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Browne: No Bayesian Solution to the Transposition Fallacy: More Reason to

No BAYESIAN SOLUTION TO THE TRANSPOSITION FALLACY:
MORE REASON TO BE SKEPTICAL OF
STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION

Kingsley R. Browne*
Courts evaluating statistical evidence of discrimination routinely
engage in a reasoning process that is widely recognized by statisticians
to be fallacious.' In a typical case, an expert would testify that the
deviation between the employer's workforce and the workforce that
would be "expected" if the employer were selecting randomly with
respect to the forbidden criterion of interest (race, sex, etc.) is
"statistically significant" because the "p-value" associated with the
disparity falls beneath some pre-established level, typically five percent.2
Courts conclude from that evidence that there is less than a five-percent
probability that the disparity occurred by chance. 3 Using the process of
"null hypothesis significance testing" ("NHST"), the expert would reject
the null hypothesis, which is that any deviations from proportional
representation are due to chance.4 This is enough for many courts to
declare that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of
discrimination.s
Despite the ubiquity of the above reasoning, it is unambiguously
wrong. It is not possible to derive the likelihood that a result is caused
by chance from the p-value used in NHST. To equate the p-value with

* Professor,

Wayne State University Law School. 0 2018 Kingsley R. Browne. E-mail:
kingsley.browne@wayne.edu. My thanks to April Bleske-Rechek for valuable comments on an

earlier version of this manuscript.
1.
See Kingsley R. Browne, PerniciousP-Values: StatisticalProofofnot Very Much, 42 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 113 (2018) [hereinafter Browne, Pernicious P-Values]; GEOFF CUMMING,
UNDERSTANDING THE NEW STATISTICS: EFFECT SIZES, CONFIDENCE INTERVALS, AND METAANALYSIS 27-28 (2012); Kingsley R. Browne, The Strangely Persistent "Transposition Fallacy":
Why "StatisticallySignificant" Evidence ofDiscriminationMay Not Be Significant, 14 LAB. LAW.
437 (1998).
2.
See Kingsley R. Browne, supra note 1.
3.
See Kingsley R. Browne, supra note 1.
4.
Id.; see also GEOFF CUMMING, supra note 1.
5.
See, e.g., Adams v. Ameritech Servs., Inc., 231 F.3d 414, 424 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting

that once the null hypothesis of random selection was rejected, it was the employer's responsibility
to offer alternative explanations).
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the likelihood of random selection is an example of the "transposition
fallacy." 6
Although legal academic commentators often commit the
transposition fallacy,' and some who may recognize it seem unwilling to
challenge it when made by others, still others have acknowledged that it
is not actually possible to quantify the likelihood of nonrandom selection
(and, a fortiori, of discriminatory selection) from the kinds of statistical
These
evidence that is available in most discrimination cases.8
commentators recognize that the probability of discrimination cannot be
derived simply from the p-value; it also requires knowledge of the "prior
probability" of discrimination-in other words, the "base rate" of
discrimination out in the real world. Thus, they have argued for the use
of a different statistical tool-Bayesian analysis-which incorporates base
rates of discrimination into the probability calculation.'
While avoiding the transposition fallacy, use of Bayesian analysis
in this context raises additional problems. First, and foremost, it is
virtually impossible to estimate with any reasonable accuracy what the
appropriate base rate of discrimination actually is. Moreover, even if it
were possible, there is a substantial question whether it is appropriate to
base an employer's liability explicitly on what other employers have
done (or are thought to have done). Such a course seems inconsistent
with the spirit, if not the letter, of evidentiary rules that prohibit reliance
on character evidence and evidence of "other bad acts."10
This article will proceed in three parts. First, I will briefly describe
the error of the transposition fallacy, which provides the impetus behind
Second, I will describe how
application of Bayesian methods."
Bayesian methods solve the transposition-fallacy problem.1 2 Third, I
will discuss why the proposed solution to the transposition fallacyincorporating estimates of base rates of discrimination-is impractical or

6.

Browne, PerniciousP-Values, supra note 1, at 115-26.

7.
Id. at 133-35.
8.
Deborah M. Weiss, The Impossibility of Agnostic Discrimination Law, 2011 UTAH L.
REV. 1677; Jason R. Bent, Hidden Priors: Toward a Unifying Theory of Systemic Disparate
Treatment Law, 91 DENVER U. L. REV. 807 (2014) [hereinafter Bent, Hidden Priors];Jason R. Bent,
The Telltale Sign of Discrimination:Probabilities, Information Asymmetries, and the Systematic
DisparateTreatment Theory, 44 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 797 (2011); Jason Bent, P-Values, Priors, and
Procedurein AntidiscriminationLaw, 63 BUFFALO L. REV. 85 (2014) [hereinafter Bent, P-Values,
Priors, and Procedures].
9.
See infra Part II.
10.
See infra Part IR.
11.
See infra Part I.

12.

See infra Part I A.
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impossible.1 3 Finally, I will describe why, even if the technical
problems could be overcome, use of base rates of discrimination is
inappropriate under the rules of evidence.1 4
I. THE TRANSPOSITION FALLACY
The transposition fallacy is a simple logical error, but it has had a
tremendous impact on courts' thinking about discrimination cases.' 5 It is

easiest to understand the fallacy in the concrete context of a hypothetical
discrimination case. Assume that an employer of 500 employees is
located in an area where 20% of the relevant local labor force is black.
The statistically "expected" number of blacks would be 20% of 500, or
100. Thus, the hypothetical universe of nondiscriminating employers of
this size would have an average of 100 black employees, with some
having more and some having fewer, with deviations from 100 being
simply the "luck of the draw." That universe could be described by a
normal (bell-shaped) curve with a mean of 100. The farther one moves
away from the mean and out into the tail, the less frequent the deviations
from expectation. Put another way, in a normal distribution, small
deviations are more likely than large deviations.
The role of statistics in discrimination cases has generally been to
test whether a particular deviation from expected is great enough to
support an inference that it is not simply random variation but rather the
product of a systematic cause, which the plaintiff would argue is a
discriminatory one. In our hypothetical, suppose that instead of having
100 black employees, the employer has just 82. Is that so many fewer
black employees that we ought to be suspicious of the cause?
The statistical expert would use "null hypothesis significance
testing" ("NHST") to decide whether the disparity is statistically
significant.1 7 The null hypothesis would be that there is no racial
difference in the probability of selection." Under the null hypothesis,
five percent of all employers (non-discriminators all) will, by definition,
have statistically significant disparities if the standard five-percent
significance level is used.1 9 If the result is one that would occur in less

13.

See infra Part H B.

14.

See infra Part IlI.

15.

See generally Browne, PerniciousP-Values, supra note 1.

16.
17.
18.
19.

See id. at 114.
For a critique of NHST generally, see id at 155-163.
See id. at 114, 118.
See id. at 114.
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than five percent of nondiscriminating employers chosen at random (that
is, if the p-value is less than .05), courts typically find the disparity
sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or even to
justify a finding of discrimination, based on their conclusion that there is
less than a five-percent probability that chance was the cause. 20 They do
so by making a fundamental mistake about the meaning of the p-value.
The p-value is calculated under the assumption that the null
hypothesis is true. 21 That is, by definition, less than five percent of the
distribution of nondiscriminating employers will have disparities
corresponding to a p-value of less than .05.22 That is a far cry, however,
from telling you that when you do observe an employer with a disparity
associated with a p-value of less than .05, there is less than a fivepercent probability that the disparity occurred by chance.23 To equate
the two probabilities is to commit the transposition fallacy. That is, the
transposition fallacy consists of equating the probability of the evidence
given the null hypothesis (p(EIH)) with the probability of the null
hypothesis given the evidence (p(HIE)).24 Logic should tell you that
because the p-value is calculated based on the assumption that the null
hypothesis is true, it cannot simultaneously provide a probability that the
null hypothesis is true.
A simple coin-flip example may make the point clearer. If one
wanted to test whether a coin was fair-that is, whether heads and tails
are equally likely to turn up when the coin is tossed-one could use
NHST, testing the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the
probability of heads or tails. If one were to flip the coin 100 times and
obtain 40 heads, the question would be whether the deviation from 50-50
is sufficiently great that we would reject the null hypothesis and
Using standard statistical
conclude that the coin is unbalanced.
techniques, we would see that one would expect a deviation that great or
greater from equality slightly less than five-percent of the time.
Employing the transposition fallacy, as courts routinely do in
discrimination cases, one would conclude that there is less than a fivepercent chance that the coin is fair.
But is it true that we can assess the probability that the coin is fair
merely from the 60:40 split? A disparity this great is expected in one out
of twenty series of coin tosses offair coins, so by what logic do we now
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See id. at 115-126.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 114-115.
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say that there is only a one in twenty chance that the coin is fair? The
fact is that we cannot. If, for example, the coin tosses had been
performed with a coin that had already been verified to be fair, we would
know that the probability that the coin was fair was 100%, irrespective
of the p-value. If conversely, we had previously measured the balance
of the coin and determined that it was asymmetrical in a way that would
strongly bias coin-flip results, we would know that the probability that
the coin was unfair was 100%, again irrespective of the p-value.
To make a judgment about the fairness of the coin, one needs to
know not only the results of the coin tosses but also the prevalence of
unfair coins. If you knew, for example, that because of quality-control
techniques employed in coin manufacturing, virtually all coins are fair,
then you should be quite confident when you get that 60:40 split that it
was indeed a random event. On the other hand, if you knew that roughly
half of all coins were unfair, then if you got such a disparity, you would
judge it much more likely that the coin was one of the unfair ones rather
than a fair coin that simply showed a chance disparity.
That reasoning shows the importance of base rates in assessing
probabilities, and it applies to discrimination cases as well.
If
discrimination is very rare, then statistically significant disparities are
very weak evidence of discrimination; if discrimination is very common,
their evidentiary force is greater.2 5 Thus, if we knew that there was no
discrimination in this world, then all statistically significant disparities
would have been caused by chance. If one percent of employers engage
in systematic discrimination, then one percent of employers would have
statistically significant disparities caused by discrimination, and among
the remaining 99 percent of employers, five-percent would have
disparities caused by chance, meaning that only approximately one-sixth
(16.9%) of all statistically significant disparities were caused by
discrimination, and the remainder were caused by chance.26 Similar
probabilities of discrimination can be calculated with base rates of
discrimination of five percent (51.3% of disparities would be caused by
discrimination), ten percent (69%), and fifty percent (95.2%). Thus,
only when the prevalence of systematic discrimination reaches fifty
percent is there less than a five-percent probability that a particular
25. Id. at 122-25. Their force still may not be very strong if there are other nonrandom
factors that plausibly might contribute to the result. Id. at 125. For purposes of the current
discussion, we are assuming that all statistically significant disparities are caused either by chance
or by discrimination. Id. at 125. In the real world, of course, there will be many such disparities that
are caused by neither. See discussion infra pp. 19-20.
26.
Browne, PerniciousP-Values, supra note 1, at 122-26.
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employer with a disparity obtained it by chance. So, depending on the
base rate of discrimination chosen in these hypotheticals, the probability
that an employer having a deviation significant at the .05 level obtained
it by chance ranges from 100 percent to 5 percent. Yet, the p-value
calculated for purposes of testing the null hypothesis is .05 in each case,
and the strength of the prima facie case in each scenario would be
deemed equivalent. 2 7 It is this disconnect between the meaning of the pvalue and the meaning that is typically ascribed to it that has led to calls
for use of Bayesian analysis.28
II. BAYESIAN ANALYSIS: A WAY TO AVOID THE TRANSPOSITION
FALLACY?

Recognizing the limitations of NHST and the error of equating a pvalue with the likelihood of discrimination, some commentators have
argued for use of Bayesian analysis in attempting to compute the
29
probability that a given employer engaged in discrimination. Recently,
both Deborah WeiSS 3 0 and Jason Bent 31 have argued that explicitly
Bayesian methods would, at least in theory, allow a more meaningful
calculation of the probability of discrimination.32
A. What Is Bayesian Analysis?
Bayesian analysis is a method by which prior beliefs or
probabilities can be incorporated into the statistical analysis, such as, in
an earlier example, the prior probability that a coin selected at random
would be fair.3 3 If a result is far-fetched, then even a low p-value is not
strong proof of its validity, while weaker statistical evidence of a highly
34
Consider
plausible claim might be may be enough to carry the day.
two studies designed to test treatments for upper-respiratory infections,
each comparing the treatment group to a placebo group. Study 1 tests

27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
See generally Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts. Increasing

Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly ProbabilisticEvidence and Methods, 75 CORNELL L.

REv. 247, 255-56 (1990).
30.
31.
32.

See Weiss, supra note 8.
See Bent, supra note 8.
See Bent, supra note 8.

33.

Kaye & Friedman, supra note 1, at 258-59.

34.

Steven N. Goodman, Of P-Values and Bayes: A Modest Proposal, 12 EPIDEMIOLOGY

295, 296 (2001).
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the effect of a new antibiotic that is derived from, and chemically similar
to, an antibiotic already known to be effective. Study 2 tests the effect
of intercessory prayer. Both studies produce equivalent results that are
statistically significant at the five-percent level. Should we treat these
two studies as equally meaningful? 35 What separates the two is that the
result in Study 1 is quite plausible, while the result in Study 2 is far less
so (even most religious people go to doctors). Thus, it is not the p-value
that gives us confidence in the result but the plausibility of the
alternative hypothesis, which turns on Bayesian "priors."
The flaw in the transposition fallacy, it will be remembered, is that
it wrongly equates the probability of the evidence given the hypothesis
(p(EIH)) with the probability of the hypothesis given the evidence
(p(HIE)), 6 probabilities that have no clear relationship to each other. In
contrast, Bayesian methods allow direct calculation of the probability of
the hypothesis given the evidence,3 7 which is the probability that one
would want. The formula for calculating p(HIE) is:
p(H|E)

_

p(H)p(EIH)
p(E
p (E)

where p(E) = p(H)p(E|H) + p(-H)p(E|-H). 38
Applying a Bayesian analysis to a hypothetical case in which the
base rate of discrimination is 10% and the p-value is .05, the relevant
terms of the formula are:
p(H) = the "prior probability"; that is, the probability of the
hypothesis that the employer in question discriminated before
we know whether the employer has a significant disparity. In
this example, the prior probability is provided exclusively by the
35.
See William S. Harris et al., A Randomized, Controlled Trial of the Effects of Remote,
Intercessory Prayer on Outcomes in Patients Admitted to the Coronary Care Unit, 159 ARCH.

INTERNAL MED. 2273 (1999) (reporting a statistically significant (p = .04) advantage in coronarycare-unit course scores in patients who had been prayed for). But see Donald A. Sandweiss, P Value

Out of Control, 160 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 1872 (2000) (arguing that the above results "suggest the
need to reassess our statistical methods for judging efficacy rather than the need to reassess the
fundamental theories of science"); See also Eric-Jan Wagenmakers et al., Why Psychologists Must
Change the Way They Analyze Their Data: The Case ofPsi: Comment on Bem (2011), 100 J. PERS.
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 426 (2011) (commenting on an article purporting to find support for precognition,
stating that "[i]nstead of revising our beliefs regarding psi, Bem's research should instead cause us

to revise our beliefs on methodology").
36. See Koehler & Shaviro,, supra note 29, at 255 n.27.
37. Id at 256.
38. Id. at 255.
39. Id. at 255 n.27.
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base rate of discrimination = .10
*

p(-H) = the prior probability that the employer did not
discriminate = .9040

*

p(EIH) = the probability of a significant disparity if the employer
discriminates = 141

*

p(EI-H) = the probability of a significant disparity if the
employer does not discriminate (the significance level) = .0542

*

p(E) = the probability that any random employer will have a

significant disparity

=

(.10)(1) + (.90)(.05)

Therefore, p(HE), which is the probability
discriminated given the observed disparity, equals

=

.1 + .045 = .145

that the employer

(10)(1) -69
.145
As can be seen, this is the same probability calculated using the more
intuitive approach described previously. 43 Where the base rate is 0, of
course, the prior probability, denoted by p(H), is 0, so the numerator is
0; hence, the probability of discrimination, represented by p(HIE), would
likewise be 0.
So, if Bayesian analysis gives an appropriate probability untainted
by the transposition fallacy, what's not to like? Well, the devil, as
always, is in the details, and the details present three perhaps insuperable
problems. The first is how to quantify the "prior probability," that is, the
base rate of discrimination, which is necessary to compute the "posterior
probability," which is the probability of interest. The second is the
assumption that p(EI-H) is equal to the significance level; put another
Id.
40.
41.
For purposes of explication, it is assumed that all discriminating employers would have
statistically significant disparities, which would not necessarily be the case, as the study my simply
not have sufficient power to detect it. Another way of saying this is that nonsignificant results do
not prove the null hypothesis. See CUMMING, supra note 1, at 29 ("We must therefore be careful not

to take statistical nonsignificance (the null is not rejected) as evidence of a zero effect (the null is
true).").

42.
For purposes of explication, it is assumed that all significant disparities are caused by
chance or discrimination, which is also not necessarily the case, as there are numerous
nondiscriminatory, but nonrandom, causes that could cause such results. See PART H(c), infra.
See text accompanying note 7, supra.
43.
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way, the assumption that chance is the only nondiscriminatory
explanation for statistically significant disparities. The third is that use
of background rates of discrimination seems inconsistent with the rules
of evidence, which typically require evidence specific to a party in
litigation and not evidence about the tendency of other similarly situated
actors to engage in the conduct that the party is accused of engaging in.
B. Where Do the PriorProbabilitiesCome From?
The inability to specify the prior probability with any accuracy at
all has long been thought to be a perhaps insurmountable barrier to use
of Bayesian analysis in many legal contexts." Both Professors Weiss
and Bent disagree. They argue, not without force, that prior probabilities
("priors") necessarily play a substantial role in any discrimination case.
That is, -the trier-of-fact, in deciding whether an observed statistical
disparity (or even an isolated event such as an individual discharge) is a
consequence of discrimination, must either use priors presented in the
courtroom or, instead, rely on its own pre-existing priors, or, as
Professor Bent calls them, "hidden priors."' That is what Professor
Weiss means by her claim that discrimination law cannot be
"agnostic." t 6 One way or another, the argument goes, someone's priors
44.
See Bent, P-Values, Priors, and Procedures, supra note 8, at 96. See also David H.
Kaye, The Numbers Game: StatisticalInference in Discrimination Cases, 80 MICH. L. REV. 833,

854 n.67, 854-55 (1982) (describing the "difficulty of institutionalizing Bayesian inference in the
law," even in relatively straightforward cases like Hazelwood and concluding that "it would not

provide that much additional guidance to the fact-finder"); Richard Lempert, Statistics in the
Courtroom: Building on Rubinfeld, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1098, 1101 (1985) (stating that "the
Bayesian perspective is unlikely to transform the way statistical data is evaluated for litigation
purposes at any time in the foreseeable future").

See Bent, Hidden Priors,supra note 8, at 840-849. Professor Bent seems to use the term
45.
"hidden priors" in two different ways. One way is the suggestion that jurors rely on their "hidden
priors"-that is, their view of the prevalence of discrimination-in reaching their verdicts after
evaluating all of the evidence. The other sense in which he uses the term is more specific. He says
that "Decision rules turning on statistically significant results from traditional hypothesis testing
necessarily involve a built-in, unstated, and unexamined assumption about the prevalence, or base

rate, of discrimination - a hidden prior." Here he seems to be referring to the "prior" as being built
in to traditional hypothesis testing using p-values. But there really is no assumption about
prevalence built in. As explained earlier, the p-value is computed assuming the null hypothesis is
true, so there is no base-rate information (other than the "zero" base rate assumed by the null

hypothesis). It is true, as noted above, that the probability of discrimination is roughly equal to the
five-percent significance level if the base rate of discrimination happens to be .5, but that's just
where the lines happen to cross; it really does not rest on anyone's "assumptions"-either explicit or
implicit-about the base rate.
46.
Weiss, supra note 8, at 1678 (stating that "whenever the factual occurrence of differential
treatment is at issue, triers of fact must make background assumptions about the societal pattern of
discrimination").
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are going to factor into a jury's verdict. Thus, rather than relying on the
intuitive priors of jurors, they argue, the priors should be supplied by
social science.4 7
The need for the trier-of-fact to rely on a set of priors is not unique
to discrimination cases.4 8 Indeed, as Judge Frank Easterbrook has noted,
"[a]ll inferences are statistical-whether implicitly or explicitly does not
matter." 49 Whenever facts are contested, the trier-of-fact is called upon
to resolve the conflict and, in doing so, will make judgments of the
plausibility of the differing accounts.o Those judgments are likely to be
strongly influenced by the trier-of-fact's intuition about how the world
works and how people in various settings are likely to behave. Those
are priors every bit as much as assumptions about the statistical
frequency of discrimination in society, and evidence relating to the
accuracy of those assumptions might well be relevant to their decisionmaking process. Usually, however, we leave it to the common sense of
the trier-of-fact to sort out. Take, for example, a lawsuit involving
allegations of excessive force by police officers. Different jurors are
likely to have different levels of receptivity to such claims depending
upon whether they think there is a lot of police brutality or very little.
Those in the latter camp are probably going to require more evidence
than those in the former before concluding that excessive force was used
in a particular instance. Logically, therefore, the rate of police brutality
is relevant to the jurors' decisions.
Attempting to specify priors in discrimination cases (or, for that
matter, police brutality cases) raises a host of practical problems. What
is the base rate of discrimination, after all? Specifically, what is the base
rate of systematic discrimination?5 1 Professor Bent notes that "[t]he
background rate of discrimination on the basis of race by all employers
in the United States may be practically unknowable, given our current
constraints on data sources and polling abilities, but theoretically it could

47.

Id. at 1679; Bent, supranote 8 at 849.

48.

Bent, supra note 8, at 848 (noting that "the use of Bayesian statistics is not unheard-of in

litigation, especially in paternity cases and DNA match criminal cases").
49.
Baylie v. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 476 F.3d 522, 523 (7th Cir. 2007).
50.
Bent, supra note 8, at 835.
51.
It is likely that any employer of substantial size has either engaged in some
discriminatory act in its history or, at least, could be presented with prima facie cases of
discrimination that it would be unable to rebut. See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). However, in a pattern or practice case, the question is not whether an employer has
discriminated at all, but whether "discrimination was the company's standard operating procedure
the regular rather than the unusual practice." International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977). Therefore, presumably it is the rate at which employers engage in
discrimination as their standard operating procedure that would be relevant.
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be an empirically measured fact." 52 But one reason that social science
does not tell us the background rate of discrimination is very obvious:
there is not a single base rate of discrimination. There are no doubt
different base rates for racial discrimination depending upon what race is
at issue, what industry is at issue, what region of the country, or even
what city, is at issue. Moreover, the rates of discrimination are likely
to be very different in a single locale for a particular racial group
depending upon the nature of the job from which the people have
allegedly been discriminatorily excluded.54 All of these rates are likely
to be different for sex discrimination than they are for race
discrimination-and different for discrimination against men and
discrimination against women-different for religious discrimination (and
different by religion) than they are for age discrimination, and so forth."
Yet the number actually chosen from the array of possible-but
practically indeterminate-discrimination rates is likely to be outcomedeterminative in the litigation.56 As Professor Bent states, "estimates of
priors can make the difference between deciding that a defendant more
likely than not engaged in systemic disparate treatment and deciding
exactly the opposite, even where the parties offer the exact same
statistical evidence." 5 7 As a result, he acknowledges that the priors "will
necessarily be at least somewhat subjective and possibly deeply
uncertain. . ."" All the more reason, one might have thought, to avoid
assessing liability on the basis of hypothetical assumptions.
So, where would these theoretically knowable priors come from?
Professor Bent suggests that there are a number of sources, including
empirical studies of the outcomes of employment discrimination
litigation," "social framework" evidence to "inform or adjust a prior

52.
53.

Bent, P-Values, Priors, andProcedure,supra note 8, at 117.
See Browne, The Strangely Persistent "Transposition Fallacy": Why

"Statistically

Significant" Evidence ofDiscriminationMay Not Be Significant, supra note 1, at 446 n.22; Weiss,
The Impossibility ofAgnostic DiscriminationLaw, supra note 8, at 1710-11.
54. See Weiss, The Impossibility of Agnostic Discrimination Law, supra note 8, at 1712
(recognizing that the likelihood of discrimination occurring can vary based on the nature of the
occupation and the specific workplace location).
55.
Id.
56.
Id.
57. Bent, Hidden Priors,supra note 8, at 837.
58. Id
59.
Bent, P-Values, Priors, and Procedure, supra note 8, at 131-132. Bent acknowledges,
however, that "empirical studies are rare, deeply flawed, or non-existent." Even if they were not,
however, they would be of limited utility. Litigated cases do not represent a random sample of
employment decisions. Of the millions of employment decisions that are made each year, only an
infinitesimal fraction of them lead to litigation, and those that do probably tend to involve
circumstances in which at least a somewhat plausible argument of discrimination could be asserted.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

11

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAWJOURNAL

302

[Vol. 35:2

probability," 60 and academic theory, 6 1 although how "academic theory"
would establish an empirical fact is not obvious-indeed, the prospect is
somewhat frightening. 62 The alternative, he says, is to allow triers-offact to rely on prior probabilities that are just "unsupported guesses,
estimates, or assertions about the state of the world, based on
idiosyncratic beliefs held by judges or fact-finders, and not based on any
evidence in the record." 63 But in the absence of a recognized,
authoritative source for the priors to which the expert would testify, it is
unclear that the expert's testimony would be an improvement. Having
two competing experts argue about what they think the base rate of
discrimination is (based in large part on speculation, albeit informed
speculation) and having the jurors base their decisions on the relative
persuasiveness, showmanship, or attractiveness of the experts does not
seem to be an improvement over basing their decisions on their own
common sense and understanding of the way the world works.
Even if social scientists could generate estimates of the prevalence
of discrimination using some sociological definition of discrimination, it
is unlikely that they could come up with a reasonable estimate of the
prevalence of illegal discrimination.
That is, any "study" of the
prevalence of discrimination nationwide would almost certainly be based
on the same kinds of statistical patterns of disproportionate
representation that the plaintiffs would be challenging in the case in
which the evidence is to be admitted. But lack of proportional
representation is not illegal.64 For an employer to be liable in a "pattern
or practice" case, the lack of proportional representation must be a
consequence of intentional invidious discrimination.6 5 Again, as the
Teamsters Court said, the plaintiffs burden is to show that invidious

60.
Id. at 118, 132-134.
61.
Id. at 134-136.
62.
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires that the scientific knowledge made
admissible by the rule be testable and have been tested. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 580, 593 (1993). It is unclear how the academic theory that might support an expert's
opinion about the prevalence of discrimination could be tested.
63.
Bent, P-Values, Priors and Procedure, supra note 8, at 136; Professor Weiss seems to
view the Bayesian priors as more subjective and qualitative, allowing social-framework evidence to
be introduced to substitute for (or at least augment) the jurors' own subjective priors. See Weiss,

supra note 8 at 1696 n.65 (stating that although her numerical examples might seem open to the
objection that "none of us have quantified views on the probabilities in question," Bayesian analysis
"also holds for qualitative judgments about relative likelihood although the formal representation of
these relationships is more complex"). See also id. at 1719 (describing ways that either courts or
experts could convey information concerning background assumptions to the jury). It is far from
clear how this would work-or even whether it could-in the real world.
64.
See Weiss, supra note 8 at 1689.

65.

See Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977).
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discrimination is the company's "standard operating procedure-the
regular rather than the unusual practice." 66
Given these circumstances, it is not clear that expert testimony,
which would be the source of the base-rate data, should even be
admissible. The rules of evidence require that expert testimony be
helpful to the jury to determine the facts at issue, based on sufficient
facts or data, and be the product of reliable principles and methods. 67
For the sociological studies to be helpful to the jury in assessing the
likelihood that the employer engaged in unlawful employment
discrimination, they would at a minimum have to speak to the
prevalence of the specific kind of unlawful discrimination at issue in the
case.6 8
Even if experts purported to opine on the prevalence of unlawful
discrimination, one might question whether agenda-driven expert
testimony is likely to give a jury a more accurate picture of the base rate
of discrimination than the jurors are likely to possess merely from being
members of the community. That is to say, there seems little reason to
believe that jurors' priors are likely less accurate than those of social
scientists-many of whom are heavily invested in careers that reward
"finding" high levels of discrimination 6 9 -and there is little chance that
academic sociologists would bring the diversity of perspectives on the
question that a randomly selected jury pool would.
There is an additional problem with the Bayesian approach
advocated by Professor Bent. In discussing application of the Bayesian
approach, he explicitly assumes that statistical disparities are caused
either by chance or by discrimination.70 For illustration of the operation
66.
67.

Id.
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:

(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of
the case.
FED. R. EvID. 702.
68.
It also may be that the relevant statistic is not what percentage of employers discriminate
but rather what percentage of individual employment decisions are tainted by discrimination, which
even for an employer found to engage in systematic discrimination may be relatively small.

69. Weiss, supra note 8, at 1684, discusses the work of William Bielby, who is, in her words,
"both a leading scholar on discrimination and a leading expert for plaintiffs." Bielby has made a
comfortable living testifying for plaintiffs in discrimination cases over the last three decades, and he

relies to a large extent on his "scholarly" work to inform his testimony.
70.

See Bent, P-Values, Priors, and Procedure,supra note 8, at 108.
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of a Bayesian analysis, that is a reasonable thing to do, and I did it when
I was discussing the meaning of the p-value. 7 1 However, it assumes that
the only prior probability of interest is the prior probability of
discrimination.7 2 Another critical probability in the real world is the
prior probability that nondiscriminatory nonrandom factors are also
operating to create a deviation from strict proportional representation.
As discussed below, that is a "prior" just as important as the base rate of
discrimination.
A. The Bayesian "Solution, " Like NHST, Tends to Focus Excessively
on the False Dichotomy of Chance Versus Discrimination
Expert testimony itself is not free of its own "hidden priors." 7 3
When sociologists examine statistical patterns and derive from them
estimates of the prevalence of discrimination, they are likely to be based
on one of the greatest "hidden priors" of all, which is an assumption
about the extent to which nonrandom statistical effects are necessarily
due to discrimination or rather to relevant group differences-whether
quantified or quantifiable, observed or unobserved-in factors such as
occupational interest, qualifications, and the like. 74 That is a major
source of contention in the literature. 7 5 Thus, if the plaintiff is permitted
to introduce evidence attempting to demonstrate the background rate of
discrimination, it would be equally open to the defendant to introduce
71.
72.

See supra Part I.
See Bent, P-Values, Priors, and Procedure, supra note 8, at 108-09; See also Bent,

Hidden Priors,supra note 8, at 821-23.
Weiss, supra note 8, 1710, accurately observes:
73.
Experts are no more exempt than the rest of us from the logic of Bayes' Law. They choose their
experimental designs and evaluate the experimental results of others in the light of their own
background assumptions, and empirical research on discrimination is no doubt influenced by prior
belief with political overtones.
74.
Application of Bayesian inference in this context thus violates the requirement that the
set of hypotheses must be "mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive." David Trafimow,
Hypothesis Testing and Theory Evaluation at the Boundaries: Surprising Insights from Bayes's

Theorem, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 526, 526, 534-35 (2003).
Failure to account adequately for systematic nondiscriminatory causes of statistical disparities is a
problem for all statistical analyses used in discrimination cases. See Kingsley R. Browne, Statistical
Proof of Discrimination:Beyond "Damned Lies," 68 WASH. L. REV. 477, 503-513 (1993)
(criticizing the "central assumption" of statistical proof set forth in Teamsters, 431 U.S., at 339-40
n.20, that "absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices
will in time result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of
the population in the community from which employees are hired").
75.
See generally Kingsley R. Browne, The Quixotic Quest for "Gender Equality", U. TOL.
L. REV. (forthcoming) KINGSLEY R. BROWNE, BIOLOGY AT WORK: RETHINKING SEXUAL EQUALITY

(2002); Kingsley R. Browne, Evolved Sex Differences and Occupational Segregation, 27 J. ORG.
BEHAV. 143 (2006).
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general evidence of group differences in interest and qualifications.7 6
This would include not just employer-specific evidence, which has been
successfully used by employers to explain statistical disparities in their
own workforces 77 but also labor-force-wide evidence that would shed
light on the meaning of the plaintiffs' expert testimony concerning
estimates of labor-force-wide discrimination, leaving jurors to decide
whose social science is right.
In suggesting the means by which Bayesian analysis can solve the
problems with statistical evidence, the focus on chance-versusdiscrimination obscures the importance of demonstrating that the
employer has actually discriminated.79 In order to narrow the focus
down to these two potential causes, one has to assume that there are no
unaccounted-for differences between the relevant groups in interest in
the jobs or in ability or qualifications, such as education, training, and
experience. This assumption would be far-fetched." One of the most
robust findings of the organizational psychology literature, for example,
is that men and women exhibit large differences in occupational interest,
and despite dramatic changes over the last half-century in women's
participation in the workforce, these differences have persisted."
Similarly, the disparate-impact literature reveals that there are large
differences between the races in the predictors of productivity.82
Multiple regression analysis can help in this respect, but the data are
invariably incomplete and often use crude proxies for the traits of
interest, which, almost by definition, means that the null hypothesisthat members of the groups at issue have the same probability of being
included in the employer's workforce if the employer is not

76.
77.
78.
79.

See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 309 (7th Cir. 1988).
Id at 308.
Id.
Trafimow, supra note 74 at 532-34 (2003).

80.

KINGSLEY R. BROWNE, BIOLOGY AT WORK: RETHINKING SEXUAL EQUALITY (2002).

81.

Id; Rong Su, James Rounds & Patrick Ian Armstrong, Men and Things, Women and

People: A Meta-Analysis of Sex Diferences in Interests, 135 PSYCHOL. BULL. 859 (2009); Kingsley
R. Browne, Evolved Sex Differences and OccupationalSegregation, 27 J. ORG. BEHAV. 143 (2006);
Browne, supra note 75.

82.
See Amy Wax, DisparateImpact Realism, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 623 (2011)
(arguing that the quest for valid predictors of job performance that do not cause a disparate impact
by race is chimerical because of the "validity-diversity tradeoff": "the most effective job selection
criteria consistently generate the smallest number of minority hires").
83.
See, e.g., EEOC v. Morgan Stanley, 324 F. Supp. 2d 451, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (rejecting
challenge to regression analysis that used experience and education as proxies for performance and
productivity, stating that "[dlisputes regarding the proper variables to employ in statistical studies
are more properly left for juries to consider and decide").
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discriminating-is not true, and perhaps not even remotely so.84 Thus,
there is no good reason to assume that once sampling error has been
rejected as the cause of a statistical disparity, discrimination is the likely
explanation. This problem, which has already been shown to be a
fundamental problem with NHST itself,85 is not any closer to being
solved through Bayesian analysis.
II. USE OF BAYESIAN PRIORS IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE RULES OF
EVIDENCE

Even apart from its unreliability, the kind of evidence that Bayesian
enthusiasts advocate is, in a fundamental way, inconsistent with
principles of evidence law. It is unlikely that a social scientist ever
would have adequate data to back up a statement such as "[b]etween
thirty and forty percent of employers in the defendant's industry engage
in systematic illegal sex discrimination" or "of the top one hundred firms
in the defendant's industry, thirteen of them engage in systematic illegal
race discrimination against blacks." But suppose the plaintiff could in
fact find an expert willing to do so-and the availability of experts willing
to provide fanciful opinions should not be underestimated." Suppose
further that the testimony is found to satisfy the reliability dictates of
Rule 702. What would be the appropriate response to such evidence
introduced to establish Bayesian priors?
The appropriate response under the evidence rules would be to
exclude the evidence, even if it were deemed a reliable indicator of the
base rate of discrimination. Fundamentally, such evidence runs afoul of
Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which limits the kind of
evidence that can be used to support an inference that a person acted in a
particular way on a particular occasion. Rule 404(a) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence bars admission of "[e]vidence of a person's character
or charactertrait ... to prove that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with the character or trait."8 7 Although there are
See Browne, PerniciousP-Values, supra note 1, at 156-58.
84.
85. Id. at 161-63.
86.
See Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REv. 473, 482
(1986) (noting that "[a]n expert can be found to testify to the truth of almost any factual theory, no
matter how frivolous . . .").
87.
FED. R. EvID. 404(a); Edward J. Imwinkelreid, Reshaping the "Grotesque"Doctrine of
CharacterEvidence: The Reform Implications of the Most Recent PsychologicalResearch, 36 SW.
U. L. REv. 741, 743 (2007-2008) (noting that forty-one states have adopted rules of evidence
patterned after the Federal Rules and that the remaining states also generally ban introduction of
character evidence). FED. R. EVID. 413-415 provide exceptions to the general rule for cases
involving sexual assault and child molestation, but those are not relevant here.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol35/iss2/3

16

Browne: No Bayesian Solution to the Transposition Fallacy: More Reason to
2018]

NO BA YESIAN SOLUTION

307

some narrow exceptions generally favoring defendants in criminal cases,
the rule absolutely forbids the use of character evidence to prove
conduct in a civil action." Moreover, Rule 404(b)(1) provides that prior
acts are "not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show
that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character." 89 Rule 404(b)(2) provides that prior acts may be admissible
for other purposes, however, including "motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of
accident," but for reasons discussed below, this subsection would be of
no help to the expert in a discrimination case.
The central function of Rule 404 is to bar evidence that is intended
to demonstrate that an actor has a "propensity" to act in a particular way
in order to prove that he acted that way at the time in question.9 0 A
number of rationales for the rules barring such evidence have been
offered. First, in many cases, it may be of only slight probative value
yet very prejudicial, because it may cause the trier of fact to find against
a defendant not because of "what he did" in the particular case but of
"who he is." 91 Although the prejudicial "you're guilty because you're a
bad person" inference may be less likely in a case involving misbehavior
of third persons,9 2 that is simply because the evidence of what others do

88.
FED. R. EviD. 404, advisory committee notes to 2006 amendment ("The Rule has been
amended to clarify that in a civil case evidence of a person's character is never admissible to prove
that the person acted in conformity with the character trait.").

89. But see FED. R. EVID. 413 and FED. R. EVID. 414, (allowing in criminal cases, evidence of
prior acts of sexual assault and child molestation by the defendant, respectively, to "be considered
on any matter to which it is relevant)." See also FED. R. EviD. 415(a) (applicable in civil cases).

90.
Courts routinely apply Rule 404 to corporations, despite the rule's reference to
"persons." See Jannotta v. Subway Sandwich Shops, Inc., 125 F.3d 503, 517 (7th Cir. 1997)
(applying FED. R. EVID. 404(b) in civil fraud case); United States ex rel. Small Bus. Admin. v.
Commercial Tech., Inc., 354 F.3d 378, 389 (5th Cir. 2003) (same); Ansell v. Green Acres
Contracting Co., 347 F.3d 515, 519 (3d Cir. 2003) (applying FED. R. EvID. 404(b) in ADEA case).
Cf Susanna M. Kim, Characteristics of Soulless Persons: The Applicability of The Character

Evidence Rule To Corporations, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 763 (2000) (after rejecting all of the
previously recognized justifications for the character rule and arguing that the real justification is
"the Kantian imperative to respect human dignity and autonomy above all other concerns,"
concluding, unsurprisingly, that the rule should not apply to corporations).

91.
See United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 276 (3rd Cir. 2014) (emphasis in original).
See also Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948):
The inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it
is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to

prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to
defend against a particular charge. The overriding policy of excluding such
evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the practical experience that
its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and
undue prejudice.

92.

Cf United States v. McKinney, 156 F.3d 1233 (6th Cir. 1998) (rejecting defendant's
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is only marginally relevant to what the defendant did. But if the jury
does not link the base rate to the defendant's inclination to discriminate,
it is not clear what the evidence is there for at all.93 As the Supreme
Court noted in Huddleston v. United States,94 under Rule 404(b),
"similar act evidence is relevant only if the jury can reasonably conclude
that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor."9 5
Evidence of prior bad acts also tends to distract the fact-finder from
the question of what happened on the occasion in question, compared to
what has happened on other occasions9 6 (in this case with others not
party to the litigation). Thus, much of the rationale for Rule 404 rests on
the same concerns animating Rule 403, which allows the trial judge to
exclude relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of... unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence."9 7 In the context of a discrimination claim against
a single employer, evidence about base rates of discrimination changes
the focus of the trial from what Acme Employer did during the legally
relevant time period to what employers across the country have done
over a broader period of time and to the myriad innocent contributors to
disparities in workplace outcomes by race, sex, age, religious, and other
categories, in workforces generally.
Evidence of Bayesian priors does not satisfy the requirements of
Rule 404(b) for introduction of evidence of other acts for nonpropensity-related purposes.9 8 The Supreme Court in Huddleston v.
United States established a four-pronged inquiry for other-acts evidence
404(b) objection to introduction of bad acts evidence relating to third person, where there was no
risk that the jury would attribute those bad acts to the defendant).

93.
94.
95.

Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691 (1988).
Id. at 688.
See also United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 671 (10th Cir. 1989) ("We do not

believe that the relevance requirement under Rules 404(b), 402 and 104(b) can be met with respect
to one defendant by introducing evidence of the bad acts of the defendant's other associates.").

96.

See United States v. Alayeto, 628 F.3d 917, 922 (7t' Cir. 2010) (upholding exclusion of

"other acts" evidence on the ground that it would distract jurors from the central issue in case).
See EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 188 (3d ed. 1984) ("Character
97.

evidence used for this purpose, while typically being of relatively slight value, usually is laden with
the dangerous baggage of prejudice, distraction, time consumption [and surprise.]"). Accordingly,
for example, courts sometimes view the admissibility of gang membership in criminal cases as a
matter to be decided just on relevance and prejudice grounds under Rules 401 and 403, see United
States v. Ford, 761 F.3d 641, 648 (6th Cir. 2014); United States v. Irvin, 87 F.3d 860, 863 (7th Cir.
1996); United States v. Ozuna, 674 F.3d 677, 682 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Skillman, 922
F.2d 1370, 1373 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. dismissed, 502 U.S. 922 (1991); and sometimes as a Rule 404
issue, see United States v. Jobson, 102 F.3d 214, 220 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Ellison, 616
F.3d 829, 833 (8th Cir. 2010); People v. Trujillo, 338 P.3d 1039, 1045 (Colo. App. 2014).
98.
See FED. R. EvID. 404.
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under that rule. 99 First, the evidence must be offered for a purpose that
is proper under Rule 404(b)-that is, for a purpose other than
propensity. 00 Second, under Rules 401 and 402, the evidence must be
relevant to proving that purpose.101 Third, the trial court must determine
under Rule 403 whether the probative value of the evidence is
substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. 10 2 Finally,
under Rule 105, the trial court must, if requested, instruct the jury that
the evidence may be considered only for the proper purpose for which it
is admitted and not for the forbidden propensity inference.103
Before considering the admissibility of evidence of background
rates of discrimination, it should be noted that even evidence that the
defendant employer itself previously engaged in discrimination is not
necessarily admissible against it in a discrimination action. In
Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn, the District Court had
excluded the age-discrimination plaintiffs proffered evidence of age
discrimination against other employees on the basis of objections raising
relevance and prejudice issues under Rules 401 and 403.104 The Tenth
Circuit reversed, interpreting the District Court's action as applying a per
se rule excluding such evidence. 0 s The Tenth Circuit then reweighed
the relevance and prejudice and ruled the challenged testimony
admissible.' 06 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, expressing
doubt that the District Court had actually applied a per se rule and
remanding with instructions to clarify the basis for its ruling. Rules 401
and 403, according to the court "do not make such evidence per se
admissible or per se inadmissible."' 0 7
99.
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988).
100. Id. at 691.
101. Id.
102. Id
103. Id at 691-92.
104.
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 380 (2008).
105. Id at 383.
106.
Sprint/United Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 380 (2008).
107. Id. at 381. The Court did not mention Rule 404(b), but logically the evidence was 404(b)
evidence, as recognized in a number of briefs on both sides in the case. See Brief for Employers
Group as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn,
No. 06-1221; id., Brief Amicus Curiae of AARP in Support of Respondent; id, Brief of Amici
Curiae Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al..; Reply Brief of Appellant, 10' Cir.
No. 05-3150. The decisions of the District Court and the Tenth Circuit also did not address Rule
404, but rather, like the Supreme Court, analyzed the case under Rules 401 and 403. The Third

Circuit has explicitly relied on Rule 404(b) to exclude evidence that the employer had engaged in
discrimination against a different employee. Becker v. ARCO Chemical Co., 207 F.3d 176 (3d Cir.
2000) (overturning District Court's refusal to order new trial based upon admission of evidence
suggesting that corporate defendant had discriminated against another employee). The Becker court
quoted an earlier Third Circuit case for the "self-evident proposition" that "a proponent's
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Evidence of Bayesian "priors" presents just the kind of risks that
Rule 404 was designed to mitigate.108 The purpose of the evidence is to
provide the trier of fact with information about rates of discrimination by
employers generally to allow it to assess the probability that the
Jurors presented with such
defendant employer discriminated.1 0 '
evidence would be told, in essence: "In finding against this defendant,
you may rely on the testimony that you have heard about unlawful acts
committed by other employers as an indication of what this employer
did."1 10 In that sense, of course, the evidence goes beyond ordinary
character evidence, which involves evidence of a particular person's
character to support an inference that he acted in a particular way.111

&

does not magically transform
incantation of the proper uses of [Rule 404(b) evidence] ...
inadmissible evidence into admissible evidence." 207 F.3d at 191 (quoting United States v. Morley,
199 F.3d 129, 133 ( 3 ' Cir. 1999). Instead, "the proponent must clearly articulate how that evidence
fits into a chain of logical inferences, no link of which may be the inference that the defendant has
the propensity to commit the crime charged." Id. The court ruled that the plaintiffs evidence of
another discriminatory act by the defendant "fails this test because the logical connection between
ARCO's alleged 'fabrication' of performance problems in relation to [the other employee's]
dismissal and its purported conduct in terminating [plaintiff] is the inference that ARCO was likely
to have fabricated customer complaints and other performance problem's in [plaintiffs] case merely
because ARCO previously engaged in a similar impropriety in facilitating [the other employee's]
dismissal." 207 F.3d at 191. The court stated: "this is the very evil that Rule 404(b) seeks to
prevent." Id. (quoting Morley, supra, 199 F.3d at 134). It should also be noted that under
Huddleston even if the evidence is supported by such a "proper" purpose, it still may be excluded
under Rule 403. See generally Lisa Marshall, The Character of Discrimination Law: The
Incompatibility of Rule 404 and Employment Discrimination Suits, 114 YALE L.J. 1063 (2005)
(noting that much evidence admitted in employment discrimination cases violates 404(b) but
arguing that the rule should be modified).
108. See Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks:A New Use of Social Science
in Law, 73 VA. L. REv. 559, 581 (1987) (noting that "[t]he policy concern that gave rise to a rule
barring the admissibility of evidence of an individual's 'characteristic' behavior applies with equal
force to the use of information on behavior characteristic of the groups to which he or she
belongs"); Allan G. King & Syeeda S. Amin, Social Framework Analysis as Inadmissible
"Character"Evidence, 32 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1 (2008). See also Allan G. King & Syeeda S.
Amin, The Propensity to Stereotype as Inadmissible "Character"Evidence, 27 ABA J. LAB.
EMP. LAw 23 (suggesting that implicit-bias evidence should be barred as impermissible character
evidence).
109. See Marshall,supra note 107 at 1802.
110. Id.at1076.
In short, then, when plaintiffs purport to offer evidence of an employer's
"motive," they overwhelmingly do so based on the following logic: The
employer's prior acts reveal that the employer has some discriminatory
mindset; ipso facto, the employer was motivated to discriminate. Nothing
more than semantics differentiates this "motive" from character propensity,
while the underlying theory of admissibility in no manner complies with Rule
404(b)'s prohibition of prior act evidence "to prove the character of a person
in order to show action in conformity therewith."
111. Id. at 1073-74.
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The Bayesian priors are evidence of the propensity of other
organizations-that is, employers in general or perhaps some crudely
specified subset of employers-introduced to prove that the defendantemployer acted in conformity with its character and indulged the same
propensity to discriminate. 1 12
If this were not statistical evidence-that is, evidence that is reduced
to a number for a statistical study-it seems unlikely that many would
suppose for an instant that it was admissible. It is hard to imagine, for
example, an expert's being permitted to testify: "I have no specific
evidence that the defendant engaged in discrimination, but let me tell
you about a lot of other employers that did." The fact that a social
scientist might aggregate instances of discrimination and characterize the
frequency of employment discrimination as a scientific-sounding
"Bayesian prior probability" to insert into a statistical formula does not
change its essential nature.1 13 Although evidence of "other acts" under
Rule 404(b) usually relates to discrete actions, such as having previously
committed a particular crime, the Bayesian argument is simply an
aggregation of such acts by some estimated percentage of all potential
actors.114 Thus, the trier of fact is being asked to draw an inference that
the defendant-employer discriminated by virtue of being an employer or,
if the base-rate evidence is more narrowly focused, by virtue of being a
particular kind of employer-which is really a kind of "profiling"
evidence. "'
The similarity of profiling evidence and character evidence (really
112.
113.

See supra Sections II.A., II.B.
See Michael D. Claus, Profiles, Syndromes, and the Rule 405 Problem: Addressing a

Form ofDisguised Characterunder the Federal Rules ofEvidence, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 973,

977 (2012) ("Disguised character evidence should not be admissible simply because it is presented
by an expert."). There is a large literature, beyond the scope of this article, on the question whether
and in what circumstances it is appropriate to treat base rates as relevant. See, e.g., Jonathan J.
Koehler, When Do Courts Think Base Rate Statistics Are Relevant?, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 373 passim

(2002); Koehler & Shaviro, supra note 26, at 257-61.
114.

See Lea Brilmayer & Lewis Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative Methods and Legal

Decisions, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 116, 149 (1978).
115.

As stated by Brilmayer & Komhauser:
If a plaintiff tries to prove discrimination in a property owner's refusal to rent
him a house, he should not be allowed to introduce data from the market as a

whole that shows discriminatory patterns in the neighborhood. The individual
owner simply cannot be held accountable for the activities of others, just as
he should likewise be unable to refute through general market statistics a
showing of discrimination. Even if a utilitarian overview of the situation
shows that it would result in greater overall accuracy to grant the would-be
tenant a remedy, we would consider the evidence irrelevant to the particular
case.

Id. at 150 n.129.
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"group character evidence") has been recognized by both
commentators1 6 and courts."' For example, in State v. McMillan, the
Ohio Court of Appeals overturned a conviction for child sexual abuse
based on the prosecution's use of profile evidence."' The defendant had
acknowledged on cross-examination that he had been sexually abused as
a child; thereafter, the prosecution called a police detective to testify,
over a defense objection, that in his experience 85 to 90 percent of child
sexual abusers had themselves been victims of abuse."'9 The appellate
court observed that this testimony was improper character evidence. It
stated:
'Group' character evidence attempts to prove that
because other persons have acted in certain ways in the
past, a defendant who shares common characteristics
with those persons is likely to have acted the same way
with respect to the crime charged. A moment's
reflection on these categories of evidence reveals that
'group' character evidence is objectionable for the same
reason as is traditional character evidence: probative
value depends upon the jury drawing the forbidden
inference that the defendant has a propensity to commit
the crime with which he is charged.1 2 0
116. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice Through Psychological
CharacterEvidence, 52 MD. L. REv. 3, 26 (1993) (noting that "profile" evidence is a form of group
character evidence that is used to show that a person does or does not fit the profile of a rapist or
child abuser in order to support the inference that it is more or less likely that the defendant

committed the charged crime); Robert P. Mosteller, Legal Doctrines Governingthe Admissibility of
Expert Testimony Concerning Social FrameworkEvidence, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 104-

05 (1989) (recognizing the similarity between social framework evidence and character evidence);
Mark S. Brodin, BehavioralScience Evidence in the Age ofDaubert:Reflections ofa Skeptic, 73 U.

CIN. L. REv. 867, 882 n.66 (2005) ("It must be noted that profile evidence offered by the
prosecution regarding the defendant (unlike syndrome evidence regarding the victim) is generally

not admissible, as it is viewed as unreliable and runs afoul of the character evidence prohibition
against painting the defendant as a particular 'criminal-type."').
See State v. McMillan, 590 N.E.2d 23, 32 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
117.
118. Id. at 33.
Id. at 31. The detective first testified that in seminars he had attended he was told that in
119.
85 to 90% of cases, the offender had himself been a victim. Coincidentally, his own experience
matched those lessons exactly.

Id. Even apart from the character-evidence issue, this evidence

should have been excluded as misleading anyway. The detective's testimony invites (though it does
not compel) the jury to engage in the transposition fallacy, equating the probability that a person
was subjected to abuse as a child with the probability that he is a child molester if he was subjected
to abuse as a child. Id at 31-32.
Id at 32. See also State v. Claflin, 690 P.2d 1186, 1190 (Wash. App. 1984) (finding that
120.
testimony that 43% of child molestations were committed by "father-figures," in a case where

defendant was a father-figure, was "extremely prejudicial and should not have been admitted"). Cf
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Similarly, in Bushell v. Dean, the court overturned a judgment in favor
of a sexual-harassment plaintiff on the ground that the trial court had
admitted expert testimony that the accused harasser fit the profile of a
sexual harasser.12 1 The court held that the profile testimony was
inadmissible character evidence under Texas's version of Rule 404 (and
also that it was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial).1 22 Other courts have
relied instead on Rules 401 and 403 to exclude profiling evidence, but
the rationales are similar. 123
In order for evidence of other acts to be admissible under Rule
404(b), the proponent "must explain how [the evidence] fits into a chain
of inferences-a chain that connects the evidence to a proper purpose, no
link of which is a forbidden propensity inference." 24 How does the fact
that X percent of employers engage in discrimination bear upon the
question of whether the defendant employer did so, if not to rely on a
propensity inference?
As previously mentioned, Rule 404(b) allows admission of
evidence of other acts to prove something other than propensity. In
discrimination cases, the most likely candidate would be intent, since
intent is critical in both individual and systemic disparate-treatment
cases.1 2 5 The "me too" evidence at issue in Mendelsohn'26 is sometimes
United States v. Doe, 149 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the "group character evidence"
argument where testimony about Nigerian drug trafficking patterns was not aimed at demonstrating
that defendant had a propensity to import drugs but "served only to illuminate the modus operandi
of Nigerian importers of Southeast Asian heroin"). The Doe court did, however, express sympathy
with the "core concern" underlying the "group character evidence" argument, "which is that juries
should not conclude that a particular defendant is guilty simply because the defendant shares some
characteristics with a particular group," which is the main argument in the case of Bayesian priors.

Id.
121. Among other things, the expert testified that a typical harasser is male, married, the
victim's supervisor, and has known the victim for at least six months. Id. at 655. Sounds dangerous.
See also Miller v. Commonwealth, 77 S.W.3d 566, 572 (Ky. 2002) ("[A] party cannot introduce
evidence of the habit of a class of individuals either to prove that another member of the class acted
the same way under similar circumstances or to prove that the person was a member of that class
because he/she acted the same way under similar circumstances."). Note again the implied
application of the transposition fallacy. Even if most harassers are male, married, the victim's
supervisor, and have known the victim for at least six months, that tells us very little about the
probability that a man with those characteristics is a harasser.

122.

See Bushell, 781 S.W.2d at 655-56.

123.

See Claus, supra note 113, at 992 ("A majority of jurisdictions considering profile and

syndrome evidence analyze it exclusively under Rules 401, 403, and 702. That is, they do not even
acknowledge that the evidence may raise a character inference."). Claus also notes that Rule 405
seems to contemplate that character evidence would come in as lay testimony rather than expert

testimony. Id. at 976.
124.
United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 442 (3d Cir. 2013).
125.
See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2); See supra Part II.B.
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ruled admissible-supposedly not to prove a propensity to discriminate
but to prove intent, a permissible use under Rule 404(b)-"because of the
inherent difficulty of proving state of mind." 27 As Lisa Marshall has
argued, however, when courts admit plaintiffs' evidence of other
discriminatory acts by the employer in a discrimination case, they
"routinely fail to comply with Rule 404."128 Courts either do not
acknowledge that the other acts raise a Rule 404 issue at all, which
seems to be the usual case, or they misapply the rule by holding that the
other acts are admissible to show motive or intent. 12 9 Yet, as Marshall
argues, whether admitted to show motive or intent, the evidence "tends
to show nothing more than that the defendant had some tendency-some
propensity-to act discriminatorily, and it is from this fact alone that the
fact-finder can infer an enduring discriminatory motive."1 30
The use of other acts of discrimination to prove intent are on far
shakier ground than what might be thought of as a classic 404(b) intent
situation.13 1 In the latter kind of case, for example, the prosecution in a
murder trial might introduce evidence that the defendant husband had
previously beaten his wife to rebut his claim that when he shot her it was
accidental.1 32 The earlier assault would tend to show that he had a
harmful intent toward his wife. 13 3 However, as emphasized above, baserate evidence in discrimination cases is not of this sort, because it does
not consist of evidence of prior acts of the employer itself that would
shed light on its state of mind.1 34 One supposes that at the murder trial,
the prosecutor could not introduce testimony about base rates of spousal
murder, either in general or by people who have previously assaulted
them.1 3 5 We would no doubt say that the question is whether this
defendant had the intent to kill, not how many other husbands have the

126.

See supra text accompanying notes 105-10.

127.
128.

Heyne v. Caruso, 69 F.3d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir. 1995).
Marshall, supra note 107, at 1065. She also notes a broader point, which is that

"propensity-based inferences exist whenever employees attempt to prove intent through statistics,"

not just when they rely on discrete "me-too" evidence. Id. at 1082.
129. Id at 1073-74.
130. Id at 1075 (referring to motive). See also id at 1082 ("Prior conduct goes to propensity,
which goes to present intent. Nothing complicates this straightforward logical progression-other
than a judge's insistence upon a faithful adherence to Rule 404."). Because "faithful adherence to
the propensity ban would, in practice, drastically limit the relief available to plaintiffs," id at 1087,
Marshall advocates replacing Rule 404 with a rule that would presume inadmissibility of prior acts
evidence and subject it to more rigorous scrutiny for prejudice, id at 1096.
See id at 1097.
131.
132.
United States v. Naranjo, 710 F.2d 1465, 1467-68 (10th Cir. 1983).
133.
Id
See supra Sections 1, I, II.A, I.B.
134.
135.
See United States v. Smith, 725 F.3d 340, 342-47 (3d Cir. 2013).
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intent to kill their wives. 13 6
To reinforce the point that evidence of Bayesian priors is really
propensity evidence, recall that the fourth prong of the Huddleston
analysis is to apply Rule 105, which requires the judge to provide a
limiting instruction to the jury, upon request, cautioning the jury that it
may consider the evidence only for its proper purpose and not for the
forbidden propensity inference.137 It is instructive to consider what the
limiting instruction would look like in a case in which the plaintiff
attempted to introduce evidence of Bayesian priors. 1 38 The jury should
be told some version of the following: "You may consider the evidence
about the rate of employer discrimination on the question of
, but you may not consider it as bearing on whether
and to what extent the defendant possessed a propensity to engage in
discrimination." 13 9 What proper purpose unrelated to the employer's
propensity for (or likelihood of) discrimination could the plaintiff use to
fill in the blank? There simply does not seem to be one. 1 40
Even if introduction of Bayesian priors did not conflict with the
Rules, instructing juries in Bayesian analysis would be a misguided
enterprise. A central contention of Bayesians is that human decisionmakers are non-Bayesian in their approach, to the chagrin of Bayesians,
who believe this to reflect a flaw in the human capacity for reason.141
But it is precisely because fact-finders tend to find a Bayesian approach
136.
137.

Id. at 342, 344-47.
Id. at 343-45 ("The proponents of Rule 404(b) evidence must do more than conjure up a

proper purpose-they must also establish a chain of inferences no link of which is based on a

propensity inference."); Ansell v. Green Acres Contracting Co., Inc., 347 F.3d 515, 520 (3d Cir.
2003) ("To be admissible under Rule 404(b), other acts evidence must be offered for a proper
purpose, i.e., a purpose other than showing that an individual has a propensity or disposition for

certain activity."); United States v. Patterson, 20 F.3d 809, 813 n.3 (10th Cir. 1994) (disapproving
the "laundry list" limiting instruction that "quoted almost all of the proper purposes listed in Rule
404(b) and went beyond the actual purposes for which the evidence was offered."); United States v.

Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 671 (10th Cir. 1989) ( "[T]he trial court must 'specifically identify the
purpose for which such evidence is offered and a broad statement merely invoking or restating Rule
404(b) will not suffice."').
138.
See Ansell, 347 F.3d at 520-2 1.
139.
Patterson,20 F.3d 809 at 812-13.
140. See United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 701-02 (7th Cir. 2012). The Miller court
disapproved of a jury instruction stating, "You may consider this evidence only on the questions of
knowledge, intent and in deciding whether the defendant's testimony is truthful in whole, in part, or
not at all." Id. at 701. Further, the Miller court noted that "when the government cannot explain
how the prior conviction [for drug dealing] relates to the question of intent without resorting to a

propensity inference, it would be unfair to expect the jury to do so based only on this instruction."
Id. at 702.
141. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of
Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430, 449-50 (1972) ("In his evaluation of evidence,
man is apparently not a conservative Bayesian: he is not Bayesian at all").
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non-intuitive that it would be a mistake to attempt to incorporate it in the
decisions of judges and juries. 14 2 Even Judge Posner, a dedicated
Bayesian, believes that the value of Bayes' theorem in the law is
heuristic rather than a prescription for decision.1 4 3 As he notes, efforts
aimed at "formalizing the tacit, intuitive inferential procedures now
employed to resolve factual disputes in trials would cause endless
confusion."1" Jurors should resolve cases based upon their conviction
that an employer did or did not discriminate, not on the basis of an
algorithm that does not track the way people actually think, thus
divorcing the jurors' job from their sense of justice.
CONCLUSION

The push for Bayesian analysis in discrimination cases is animated,
at least in part, by a recognition that the typical mode of statistical
inference in discrimination cases is faulty. Yet substituting one flawed
methodology for another is hardly an improvement. The Bayesian
methodology necessarily relies on arbitrary and speculative assumptions
about base rates of discrimination and also allows an employer to be
held liable based in large part on conclusions about the frequency of
wrongdoing by other employers. 14 5 Those advocating the advantage of
one statistical technique over another should consider that perhaps in
many cases statistical evidence simply lacks probative value and may
not be very useful in determining whether a particular employer has
engaged in discrimination.

142.

Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV.

1477, 1479 (1999).
143.
Id.
Id.
144.
145.
See supra Sections H.B, H.C.
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